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YOUR NATURAL GAS IS NOT CYBER-SECURE: A TWO-FOLD 
CASE FOR WHY VOLUNTARY NATURAL GAS PIPELINE 
CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES SHOULD BECOME MANDATORY 
REGULATIONS OVERSEEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
Madeline A Labovitz* 
In the past two decades, the United States has increased the 
production and use of natural gas to fuel every day American life. 
This increase has resulted in the construction of millions of miles of 
natural gas pipelines. While this development has produced a 
number of benefits, natural gas pipelines have introduced the threat 
of cyberattacks on natural gas infrastructure. This substantial threat 
is currently managed by voluntary guidelines promulgated by the 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”). While the private 
industry is satisfied to maintain the status quo and leave these 
threats essentially self-regulated, voluntary guidelines are not 
sufficient to defend against the cybersecurity threats posed to 
natural gas pipelines. This Recent Development proposes that 
cybersecurity standards should become mandatory and that the 
Department of Energy, not TSA, is the proper agency to promulgate 
mandatory cybersecurity regulations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Today, the U.S. is the world’s largest natural gas producer.1 By 
2020, the U.S. is projected to be the world’s third largest exporter of 
liquified natural gas.2 Natural gas is a volatile and dangerous product 
generally transported by pipelines that have largely computerized 
 
1 See SARAH LADISLAW ET AL., U.S. NATURAL GAS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 
(2017); Alex Dewar et al., Preparing for an Abundance of US Natural Gas, 
BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.bcg.com/publications/ 
2019/united-states-us-abundance-natural-gas.aspx [https://perma.cc/QZ77-
CPRG]. 
2 Dewar et al., supra note 1. 
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operations.3 While computerization has allowed the millions of 
miles of American pipelines to operate efficiently, the technology 
has rendered natural gas pipelines vulnerable to sophisticated 
cyberattacks from adversaries.4 
To combat this threat, cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines has 
been left exclusively to the Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”).5 TSA, to the satisfaction of the private industry, has only 
released voluntary guidelines leaving natural gas pipelines 
essentially self-regulated.6 However, there has been push back by 
policy makers and agencies to vest different agencies with the ability 
to exact stronger natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.7  
In Part II, this article will discuss the background of natural gas 
in the U.S. and the general risks posed by natural gas production and 
transportation. As the interdependency between natural gas 
pipelines and the electric grid is steadily increasing, Part III will 
discuss the cybersecurity threats energy infrastructure faces in 
general. Part IV will specifically describe the cybersecurity threats 
posed to natural gas pipelines. Part V will detail the regulatory 
scheme, or lack thereof, in place to address and combat natural gas 
pipeline cybersecurity threats. Part VI will argue that the voluntary 
guidelines that currently instruct natural gas pipeline cybersecurity 
should be mandatory. Finally, Part VII will advocate that as the 
 
3 See How Does the Natural Gas Delivery System Work?, AMERICAN GAS 
ASS’N, https://www.aga.org/natural-gas/delivery/how-does-the-natural-gas-
delivery-system-work-/ [https://perma.cc/VR6F-9FT9]. 
4 See Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
112th Cong. 3 (statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director of Information 
Security Issues), https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590367.pdf. 
5 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-48, CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT 
WEAKNESSES IN TSA’S PIPELINE SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 1 (2018). 
6 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMIN.: PIPELINE SECURITY GUIDELINES 1 
(2018). 
7 See Rebecca Kern, Looming Cybersecurity Battle: Who Protects U.S. 
Pipelines?, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 22, 2018), https://news.bloomberg 
environment.com/environment-and-energy/looming-cybersecurity-battle-who-
protects-us-pipelines-corrected [https://perma.cc/4Z99-VR98]; Blake Sobczak, 
Battle lines form over pipeline cyberthreat, E&E NEWS (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060784805 [https://perma.cc/VW7F-P3WF]. 
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guidelines become mandatory regulations, the Department of 
Energy (“DOE”), not TSA, should be the agency to promulgate 
natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.  
II.  BACKGROUND OF NATURAL GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Natural gas use is not confined to electricity generation; it is a 
versatile and multi-use product.8 Natural gas has become an 
essential staple for most Americans.9 Not only does natural gas heat 
one half of U.S. residents’ homes and is used to cook their food, but 
natural gas is used for fuel, and for backup generators.10 Further, as 
coal becomes obsolete, natural gas has become its replacement.11  
Natural gas’ prominence in the U.S. has grown considerably in 
recent decades to account for 31% of U.S. primary energy 
consumption today.12 In the U.S., 34.1% of natural gas is used for 
fuel, 31.3% is used for industrial purposes, and 20.7% is used for 
cooking and heating.13 Least substantially, 13.8% of natural gas is 
used for commercial purposes and 0.1% is used for vehicle fuel.14  
Though natural gas plays such a significant role in American 
life, as recently as 2005, the U.S. was highly dependent on foreign 
 
8 Hobart M. King, Uses of Natural Gas, GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/ 
articles/natural-gas-uses/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/R8KD-
TBBF]. 
9 See id. 
10 Id.; History of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, DIRECT ENERGY, 
https://www.directenergy.com/learning-center/energy-choice/history-of-natural-
gas-industry (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VP2Z-TUWU]. 
11 History of the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, supra note 10.  
12 U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/D9QG-
CUCJ]; Glossary of Statistical Term: Primary Energy Consumptions, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/ 
detail.asp?ID=2112 (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B52H-EGXE]. 
“Primary energy consumption refers to the direct use at the source, or supply to 
users without transformation, of crude energy, that is, energy that has not been 
subjected to any conversion or transformation process.” Id. Natural gas accounts 
for the second largest percentage of U.S. primary energy consumption. 
Petroleum makes up the largest percentage accounting for 36% of U.S. primary 
energy consumption. Id. 
13 King, supra note 8. 
14 Id.  
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imports of natural gas to meet demand.15 This dependence led to 
historically high natural gas prices and predictions that the U.S. 
would experience a natural gas crisis in 2005.16 However, the high 
prices, increasing demand, and continued reliance on foreign 
imports pushed the U.S. industry towards innovation. In the early 
2000s, hydraulic fracturing was combined with horizontal drilling 
to enable, for the first time, oil and gas production from U.S. shale 
formations.17  
 Instead of the predicted natural gas crisis, in 2005, the new 
techniques led the U.S. to a natural gas boom and domestic 
production outpaced domestic need in 2015.18 The increase in 
production, caused natural gas prices to plummet, decreasing from 
$13.42 per million BTUs in 2005 to $2.65 per million BTUs by the 
end of 2019.19 The decreasing cost and increasing demand for 
natural gas, specifically in 2009, resulted in the construction of new 
natural gas pipelines.20 Today, the U.S. contains nearly 3 million 
miles of pipelines used to deliver the approximately 30 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas produced in the U.S.21  
 
15 Natural Gas Explained: Use of Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 
10, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/use-of-natural-
gas.php [https://perma.cc/7A8T-TC8C]; see LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1. 
16 See LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1. 
17 Id.; Robert Rapier, How the Shale Boom Turned the World Upside Down, 
FORBES (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/04/21/how-
the-shale-boom-turned-the-world-upside-down/#7ef8bfa777d2 
[https://perma.cc/9GPE-923C]. Hydraulic fracturing is technique that has been 
around since the 1940s that pumps water and a variety of chemicals down an oil 
or gas well to fracture reservoir rock and release natural gas. Id. 
18 See LADISLAW ET AL., supra note 1; Rapier, supra note 17.  
19 Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-
pipelines.php [https://perma.cc/F6NP-ZGF6]; Natural Gas: Henry Hub Natural 
Gas Spot Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ 
hist/rngwhhdM.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/S25G-
VBUN]. A “BTU” is a British Thermal Unit. 
20 Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, supra note 19.  
21 Id.; Natural Gas Explained: Where Our Natural Gas Comes From, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/ 
natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php [https://perma.cc/U72A-
LMMM]; James Chen, Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf), INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trillion-cubic-feet.asp 
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While natural gas plays a critical role in U.S. life and economy, 
there are some inherent dangers associated with natural gas use and 
production that amplify the danger of cybersecurity threats. For 
example, poorly maintained equipment can result in carbon 
monoxide poisoning.22 Natural gas pipelines can also leak, leading 
to explosions.23 Moreover, the computerization of natural gas 
pipelines has also led to unintentional damage as “software upgrades 
and defective equipment” can “inadvertently disrupt systems” and 
cause damage.24  
 Even absent a cybersecurity threat from an adversary, 
natural gas accidents in the U.S. have resulted in widespread service 
disruption, serious destruction and even death. For example, a 
natural gas pipeline exploded in San Francisco in 2019 when a 
construction company accidentally cut into the natural gas main.25 
The explosion, described as shooting a “tower of flames into the 
sky,” seriously damaged a number of buildings.26 Also in 2019, a 
natural gas pipeline in Durham, North Carolina caused an explosion 
 
[https://perma.cc/AC7F-RNXS]. Natural gas increased to 30 Tcf from 19.18 Tcf 
of natural gas produced at the start of 2000. “Trillion cubic feet,” or Tcf, is the 
unit used by the oil and gas industry to measure natural gas. The measurement 
can be difficult to quantify, and it is most commonly equated to one quadrillion 
of a British thermal unit, which represents the amount of heat “required to raise 
the temperature of a single pound of water by one-degree Fahrenheit at sea 
level.” Id. 
22 Natural Gas Safety, OHIO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMM’N, 
https://www.puco.ohio.gov/be-informed/consumer-topics/natural-gas-safety/ 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5WK6-6MJS]. 
23 Id. 
24 Cybersecurity Threats Impacting the Nation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight, Investigations, and Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec., supra note 
4. 
25 Dan Noyes, What We Know About Gas Explosion in San Francisco, ABC 7 
NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://abc7news.com/what-we-know-about-gas-
explosion-in-san-francisco/5125028/ [https://perma.cc/FT3X-MYY4]. 
26 Janie Har, San Francisco Gas Explosion Shoots Fire that Burns 5 Buildings, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/02/06/ 
san-francisco-gas-line-explosion-buildings-fire/2796109002/ 
[https://perma.cc/GD7Q-5FFL]. 
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when a “a gas service line was struck during a horizontal boring 
operation.”27 The explosion killed two people.28 
 The severe consequences a natural gas pipeline attack could 
have on life, property, the economy, and the environment combined 
with the volatility of the product makes pipelines highly attractive 
targets for those with malicious intent.29 Adversaries can capitalize 
on the devastation natural gas naturally causes to threaten critical 
infrastructure and human life through a cyberattack on the pipelines 
that transport natural gas.30 The technology used to operate and 
control natural gas pipelines serves as an entrance to those that seek 
to cause serious harm.  
III. CYBER THREATS TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
According to the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation’s president and CEO, “the threat of [a] cyberattack is at 
an all-time high.”31 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
has similarly reported that over the past several years, the energy 
sector has “incurred more cybersecurity incidents than any other 
sector.”32 Moreover, DOE reported that the “frequency, scale, and 
sophistication of cyber threats have increased, and attacks have 
become easier to launch.”33 As natural gas pipelines have 
increasingly relied on computerized systems, adversaries may wish 
 
27 Josh Chaplin, Durham Fire Department Releases Findings in Report on 




29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5.  
30 See PIPELINE SECURITY: HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 
1 (2019); Physical Security, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASS’N OF AMERICA, 
https://www.ingaa.org/Pipelines101/Security/26508.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/XTF3-5K2L]. 
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5. 
32 Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, Terrorism and Oil & Gas Pipeline 
Infrastructure: Vulnerability and Potential Liability for Cybersecurity Attacks, 2 
OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. & ENERGY J. 579, 581 (2017). 
33 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 11–12.  
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to utilize pipelines to launch attacks with devastating 
consequences.34   
While the U.S. has not yet experienced a cyberattack that 
resulted in death or a catastrophic disruption in the flow of oil or 
gas, cyberattacks on natural gas pipelines can result in significant 
physical damage such as “explosions, spills, or fires, which will 
easily threaten human life, property and the environment.”35 
Cyberattacks can also lead to electricity production outages.36 
Foreign cyberattacks on energy infrastructure show how serious 
energy cyberattacks can be.  
As the U.S. increases reliance on natural gas, the impact of a 
cyberattack on critical energy infrastructure is exacerbated.37 The 
interdependency between natural gas pipelines and the electric grid 
has steadily increased. As a result, it is important to understand the 
threats to America’s electric grid to recognize the risks natural gas 
pipelines face.  
A. Ukraine’s Electric Grid Cyberattack 
In a display of the effectiveness of an energy infrastructure 
cyberattack, Ukrainian power companies experienced unscheduled 
power outages, affecting 225,000 local customers in December 
 
34 Physical Security, supra note 30; see HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES IN THE 
116TH CONGRESS, supra note 30; see Hillary Hellmann, Comment, 
Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United States Pipeline SCADA Systems, 36 
ENERGY L.J. 157, 159 (2015). Liquid and gas transmission pipelines utilize 
SCADA technology to “control thousands of miles of pipelines from one central 
location. Human controllers can input commands to remotely operate pipeline 
control equipment” to control such components as pressure, temperature, and 
rate of oil or gas flow. Id. 
35 Clifford Krauss, Cyberattack Shows Vulnerability of Gas Pipeline Network, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/business/ 
energy-environment/pipeline-cyberattack.html [https://perma.cc/S8MK-RT7G]. 
36 Id. 
37 Elisabeth Buchwald, The Use of Natural Gas Exposes U.S. to Cyber Attacks, 
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2015.38 The power outages were determined to be the result of an 
external cyberattack.39 DHS released a formal report detailing the 
attack, which stated that the attackers remotely targeted three 
regional electric power distribution companies and by “leveraging 
legitimate credentials obtained via unknown means, remotely 
operated breakers to disconnect power” and “wiped some systems 
by executing the KillDisk malware at the conclusion of the 
cyberattack.”40 
The cyber-attackers utilized known methods of cyber intrusions 
and techniques that had not before been used in a cyberattack.41 The 
initial intrusion came from spear-phising, whereby an attack 
originates in a business system and “migrate[s] to operations 
systems.”42 Attackers sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office 
documents that contained the malware used to gain access to the 
electricity company’s networks.43 This enabled the attackers to the 
steal credentials necessary to access the company’s network 
allowing the attackers to issue commands remotely in order to 
schedule service outages.44 The attackers were also able to access 
telephone systems in order to generate an overload of calls to the 
energy company denying access to customers attempting to report 
outages.45 
 
38 ROBERT M. LEE ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER ATTACK ON THE UKRAINIAN 
POWER GRID v (Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center 2016); ICS 
Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical 
Infrastructure, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.us-
cert.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 [hereinafter ICS Alert] 
[https://perma.cc/6GDA-7GAC]. 
39 ICS Alert, supra note 38. 
40 NCCIS/ICS-CERT INCIDENT ALERT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 7, 
2016).  
41 Id. 
42 Id.; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 13. Spear-phishing 
is sending a recipient official-looking emails that contain malware (harmful 
software programs) that will insert into a computer system and allow the sender 
to gain access to business information and confidential data. Id. 
43 NCCIS/ICS-CERT INCIDENT ALERT, supra note 40; LEE ET AL., supra note 
38, at 1.  
44 See LEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 2. 
45 See id.  
226 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 217 
The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center noted 
that the attacker’s strongest capability was not the complexity of 
their cyberattack on Ukraine, but rather the attacker’s ability to 
“perform long-term [surveillance] operations required to learn the 
environment and execute a highly synchronized, multistage, 
multisite attack.”46 The Ukrainian cyberattack took place 
immediately after “a political revolution in Kiev, the annexation of 
Crimea, and amid military clashes in the eastern Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions.”47 The U.S. government and cybersecurity firms 
attributed the Ukraine cyberattack to Russia as an act of cyber 
warfare.48 While the Ukraine cyberattack was on the electric grid 
generally, it demonstrated “one nation’s ability to disrupt another by 
shutting down operations and damaging physical equipment.”49  
The techniques demonstrated by Russia are transferable to 
natural gas pipelines. In fact, a Russian group, Black Ghost 
Knifefish,” has targeted U.S. natural gas and highlights the growing 
concern of cyber warfare on energy infrastructure.50  
B. Energy Infrastructure Cyberattacks Have Morphed into Cyber 
Warfare 
Today, nations can “cause warlike damage to their enemy’s vital 
infrastructure without launching a military strike.”51 In Ukraine, 
Russian intrusion into their electric grid resulted in power outages 
 
46 See id. 
47 Donghui Park et al., Cyberattack on Critical Infrastructure: Russia and the 
Ukrainian Power Grid Attacks, U. OF WASH. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://jsis.washington.edu/news/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-russia-
ukrainian-power-grid-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/5SFW-Q48Z].  
48 Id.  
49 Jean-Marc Ollagnier, Cyberattacks are Becoming a Greater Challenge for the 




51 Beatrice Christofaro, Cyberattacks are the Newest Frontier of War and Can 
Strike Harder than a Natural Disaster. Here’s Why the US Could Struggle to 
Cope if it Got Hit, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2019), https://www.businessinsider. 
com/cyber-attack-us-struggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4 
[https://perma.cc/98YH-5AC5]. 
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for a quarter of a million people.52 A shut down of the electric grid 
does not just result in darkness. Rather, phones and the internet do 
not work, transportation idles because fuel is inaccessible and 
charging stations are inoperable.53 The same rings true for banks, 
ATMs, heating and air conditioning, which would not work.54 
Hospitals and emergency services would similarly not be 
available.55 
While nearly everyone in the U.S. has experienced an electric 
outage from accidents or storms, the potential blackout that could 
come from an energy infrastructure cyberattack is unprecedented. 
Unlike a cyberattack, when a major natural disaster, like a hurricane, 
knocks out power, the U.S. can be reasonably certain when the 
hurricane will end. Further, hurricanes do not “return to strike a 
second or third time” and do not “replicate themselves in other parts 
of the country.”56 Connecticut’s chief cybersecurity risk officer, 
Arthur House, predicted that within two weeks of a cyberattack 
caused power outage, the U.S. “might exhaust reserve fuel to 
generate utility services,” “[p]ublic order would be strained,” and 
“[t]he hit on commerce could be devastating.”57 
The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(“DARPA”) is conducting projects to determine U.S. capabilities to 
recover from a cyberattack that caused power outages like that in 
Ukraine.58 On the restrictive and secretive Plum Island, normally 
used to conduct research on infectious diseases, DARPA ran a 
program that simulated power grid deactivation that could ensue 
 
52 LEE ET AL., supra note 38, at iv.  
53 John E. Shkor & Timothy Connors, Escalation of Cyber Warfare Puts US 






56 Arthur H. House, We’d be Crippled by a Cyberattack on our Utilities, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/wed-be-
crippled-by-a-cyberattack-on-our-utilities/2018/10/14/206b0dc6-cca8-11e8-
a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html [https://perma.cc/HM8W-MSV9]. 
57 Id.  
58 Christofaro, supra note 51.  
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from an energy infrastructure cyberattack.59 DARPA’s program 
director, Walter Weiss, described the process of bringing the grid 
back from deactivation as “painstaking” and “slow.”60  
The federal government has taken steps to increase U.S. energy 
infrastructure cybersecurity. Executive Order 13800 called for an 
assessment of the detrimental effects that a prolonged power outage 
from a cyberattack would have on the country as well as gaps and 
vulnerabilities in America’s preparedness for an energy 
infrastructure cyberattack.61 It appears, however, that America’s 
focus on energy cybersecurity stops short of natural gas pipelines. 
Though the threat to natural gas pipeline cybersecurity is prevalent, 
acknowledged, and increasingly serious, cybersecurity for natural 
gas pipelines is not yet prioritized.  
IV. CYBERSECURITY THREATS TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES 
 While the above cyberattacks were on the electric gird and 
not specifically natural gas pipelines, the interdependency between 
natural gas pipelines and the electric grid is steadily increasing.62 
Thus the cyber vulnerabilities of natural gas pipelines are important 
in their own right and even more so because of the effect that the 
vulnerabilities have on the electric power sector as a whole.63 DOE 
reported in 2017 that the electric sector is increasingly reliant on 
gas-fired energy: in 2005 natural gas accounted for 9% of the United 
States’ electricity generation, grew to 30% by 2013, and reached 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. While trial runs of worst-case scenario reboots have worked, Weiss has 
expressed serious concern over how “fragile and prone to disruption” a recovery 
effort might be. Id. 
61 Exec. Order No. 13800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22, 391 (2017).   
62 Mark Tarallo, Is Pipeline Security Adequate?, ASIS INT’L (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2019/10/is-
pipeline-security-adequate/ [https://perma.cc/D2WT-RP4V].  
63 Id.  
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42% by 2016.64 As natural gas has “become a major part of the fuel 
mix” the urgency of pipeline cybersecurity threats has increased.65  
A. Methods of Cyberattacks on Natural Gas Pipelines 
Natural gas pipelines have moved to computerized systems, 
which are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Most pipelines use the 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) systems.66 
SCADA collects real-time data to provide the pipeline operator with 
“feedback and information about the entire pipeline system and 
triggers safety alarms when operating conditions are not within the 
prescribed design parameters.”67 In turn, operators can remotely 
send commands to control the variables measured and reported by 
SCADA.68  
While SCADA is useful to pipelines in that they can reduce 
operating costs and increase system efficiency, SCADA can cause 
destruction even without an outside adversary.69 For example, the 
San Bruno pipeline explosion, which killed eight people, injured 
fifty-eight others, and destroyed thirty-eight homes was a result of 
“erroneous and unavailable SCADA pressure readings.”70 Natural 
gas pipeline explosions resulting from faulty SCADA readings and 
signals also occurred in Bellingham, Washington and Texas City, 
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70 Id. at 586. The pipeline explosion in Bellingham, Washington resulted from 
the faulty of the SCADA system and caused spillage of 237,000 gallons of 
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Texas, both of which resulted in loss of life.71 SCADA is also 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks that could 
increase these deadly accidents.72  
The Congressional Research Service states “cyber infiltration of 
[SCADA] could allow successful ‘hackers’ to disrupt pipeline 
services and cause spills, explosions, or fires – all from remote 
locations via the Internet or other communication pathways.”73 In 
other words, adversaries could capitalize on the damage SCADA is 
already capable of executing and manipulate the system to result in 
more death and destruction.74  
There are a variety of other methods that an adversary could use 
to threaten the cybersecurity of a natural gas pipeline.75 For example, 
attackers can infiltrate an organization’s operation systems through 
a communication pathway such as the internet to “disrupt its service 
and cause spills, releases, explosions, or fires.”76 Another potential 
avenue to conduct a cyberattack is through spear-phishing.77 
Adversaries can also access and infiltrate the control valves, 
pressure monitors, and other equipment that are connected to 
wireless networks, which are vital to the pipelines functioning.78 
B. Examples of Natural Gas Pipeline Attacks 
While the U.S. has not experienced a cyberattack that has caused 
physical damage to natural gas pipelines, foreign pipelines have 
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been damaged at the hands of cyberattackers. For example, in 1982 
the Trans-Siberian pipeline, which runs over much of Russia, 
experienced a significant explosion.79 A “malicious code” in the 
pipeline control software caused the explosion by increasing the 
pipeline pressure.80 The explosion equaled that of a nuclear 
weapon.81  
In 2008, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which spans from 
the Caspian Sea to the Turkish Mediterranean coast and is outfitted 
with “sensors and cameras to monitor every inch of the line” 
exploded without triggering any alarms or cameras.82 The mystery 
source of the explosion turned out to be a “sophisticated cyberattack 
on the pipeline’s control system.”83 Though the source of the attack 
is not definitively known, attackers tied to the Russian government 
were able to access the pipeline computer system through the 
surveillance cameras and cost billions of dollars in lost tariffs and 
export revenue.84 While the exact capabilities of the attackers are 
also not known, the pipeline had just installed new cameras that 
possessed communication software vulnerable to attacks.85 It was 
reported that the vulnerabilities were exploited and the attackers 
gained entry onto the network through the computers.86 The 
attackers were also said to have intruded into the alarm server 
through a Windows operating system containing malicious 
software.87 
Cyberattacks on U.S. natural gas pipelines are not just a 
possibility, but America’s natural gas pipelines have already 
experienced a number of cyberattacks. For example, DHS and FBI 
have found that Russia has already “infiltrated the U.S. electric grid, 
embed[ded] malware that could incapacitate power plants, 
 
79 Dancy & Dancy, supra note 32, at 587. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 588. 
82 Id.   
83 Id.  
84 Robert M. Lee et al., Media report of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
Cyber Attack, INDUS. CONTROL SYS. 3 (Dec. 20, 2014); Dancy & Dancy, supra 
note 32, at 588–89. 
85 Lee et al., supra note 84, at 3–4.  
86 Id. at 4.  
87 Id.  
232 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 217 
pipelines, and water supplies, and . . . ha[s] even gained access to 
power plant control rooms.”88  In 2012, specifically, Industrial 
Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team identified a 
number of cyber intrusions that targeted natural gas pipelines, which 
were traced back to a “single campaign with spear-phishing 
activity.”89 In 2018, a cyberattack in Houston, Texas did not disrupt 
gas service but “forced four of the nation’s natural-gas pipeline 
operators to temporarily shut down computer communications with 
their customers.”90 More recently in 2019, a firewall was “exploited” 
at a western U.S. utility, which caused devices to reboot and 
communication disruptions.91  
C. Natural Gas Pipelines Cyber Warfare 
In response to these attacks and even larger vulnerabilities, the 
U.S. is taking actions that “are potential game changers in the global 
escalation of cyber warfare.”92 The U.S. is on “cyberwar footing” 
with Iran’s military command and control networks and Russia’s 
electric grid.93 For example, the U.S. has imbedded computer codes 
that are “the digital equivalent of bombs that could be detonated” 
throughout Russia’s electric grid.94 Moreover, in June 2019, 
President Donald Trump ordered a cyberstrike against the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps that disabled Iranian computer systems 
that were posed to attack oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.95 
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These are examples of offensive cyber warfare tactics and show 
cyberattacks are now used as an active war tool and have been 
formally weaponized. These offensive efforts also increase the 
likelihood of a counterattack, exacerbating the need for the U.S. to 
bolster energy infrastructure cybersecurity.96 In 2008, the 
Department of Defense sought to strengthen U.S. energy 
cybersecurity through the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command.97 
Cyber Command’s job is to direct, synchronize, and coordinate 
“cyberspace planning and operations in defense of the U.S. and its 
interests.”98 President Trump’s 2020 budget also requested $9.6 
billion for cyber defense and offensive operations through Cyber 
Command.99 
Cyber Command is a reaction to the cyber-intrusions and 
cyberattacks that threaten America’s energy infrastructure. 
America’s natural gas pipelines, however, remain vulnerable 
because of a lack of any meaningful regulation or protection.100 
Natural gas pipelines’ main weakness is that the regulatory 
framework that governs the infrastructure’s cybersecurity is 
ineffective. TSA is the regulatory body that oversees natural gas 
pipeline cybersecurity, but they have promulgated only voluntary 
guidelines, which impose no actual requirements on natural gas 
pipelines.101  
Though cyber-intrusions have not yet resulted in physical 
damage or death, the current regulatory framework is not sufficient 
to prevent against the growing threat of a cyberattack on natural gas 
pipelines. TSA has no way to “ensure that its guidelines reflect the 
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latest known standards and best practices for physical security and 
cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment 
that pipelines face.”102  
Cyber-threats evolve with technology to become more deadly 
and destructive. As the threats evolve, cybersecurity regulations 
need to rise to meet them, which current regulations are unable to 
do.103 TSA lacks the resources necessary to strengthen and enforce 
mandatory guidelines making TSA unlikely to implement 
mandatory regulations and similarly renders TSA the wrong agency 
to promulgate mandatory regulations. Rather, DOE should 
promulgate natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations. 
V. CURRENT REGULATIONS OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES 
Over time, natural gas extraction, production, and mobility has 
been regulated by a number of different agencies.104 While local 
governments originally regulated the natural gas markets, the 
natural gas business possessed many of the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly, making it a prime product for federal 
regulation.105 In other words, one “distribution network could 
deliver natural gas more cheaply than two companies with overlying 
distribution networks and markets.”106 Further, the natural gas 
industry was “clothed in the public interest” in that people needed 
access to cheap, reliable natural gas.107  
In exchange for the ability to operate as a monopoly, natural gas 
had to accept heavy regulation to prevent the industry from taking 
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advantage of its exclusive position, known as the regulatory 
compact.108 Today, a number of different agencies regulate the 
various aspects of natural gas. TSA, housed within DHS, oversees 
natural gas pipeline security.109 The Pipeline and Hazardous 
Material Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), a sub-agency of the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”), as well as DOE play a role 
in response and recovery if a natural gas pipeline cybersecurity 
incident or intrusion occurs.110 
A. Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Markets 
Local regulation was effective during the early days of natural 
gas.111 By the early 1900s, however, local regulation became more 
difficult as natural gas was distributed between municipalities and 
local governments no longer oversaw the entire natural gas 
distribution chain.112 State governments intervened and began to 
regulate natural gas distribution through public utility commissions 
and public service commissions.113  
Technology, however, developed to allow natural gas to be 
transported between states.114 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
“Commerce Clause Cases” held that state regulation of natural gas 
pipelines violated the interstate commerce clause.115 As a result of 
the decision, state governments could no longer regulate interstate 
pipelines but, at the time of the decision, no federal legislation 
addressed interstate pipelines.116 
Congress responded to this gap with the passage of the Natural 
Gas Act (“NGA”) of 1938.117 Finally, the federal government, 
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through the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) could directly 
regulate interstate natural gas.118 FPC also had the authority to 
approve any new interstate pipelines.119 In 1954, because of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin120, 
wellhead prices were also brought under FPC regulation, granting 
FPC more control over natural gas pipelines.121 
While the NGA filled a regulatory gap, the Act was disastrous 
for America’s natural gas market and resulted in a 1978 natural gas 
shortage.122 In response, FPC was reorganized into the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and Congress enacted 
the Natural Gas Policy Act to create a “single national natural gas 
market” regulated under FERC.123  
Today, FERC is the main authority in natural gas pipeline 
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pipeline safety or security.125 Rather, FERC works with other 
agencies that oversee various aspects of natural gas pipeline safety 
and security.126  
B. Natural Gas Pipeline Security Oversight: TSA 
The primary agency charged with natural gas pipeline security 
responsibilities is TSA.127 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA to 
oversee the security of all modes of transportation under DOT.128 A 
year later, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred TSA from 
DOT to DHS where it remains today.129  
To comply with their security responsibilities, TSA maintains 
the Pipeline Security Division, which “works to develop security 
measures to mitigate risk, monitor compliance with security 
guidelines, and build and maintain stakeholder relations.”130 TSA 
also possesses the authority to issue physical and cybersecurity 
regulations for natural gas pipelines.131 However, the agency has 
declined to issue new rules or regulations to address natural gas 
pipeline security since 9/11.132 In reality, no bright line regulations 
have ever been issued by TSA.133 Instead, TSA has issued a series 
of guidelines—specifically the Pipeline Security Guidelines—
which were updated in 2018 for the first time since 2011.134 
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The Pipeline Security Guidelines lay out a “Corporate Security 
Program” and encourage pipeline operators to establish and 
implement the program.135 The program’s key recommendations are 
to develop a corporate security plan, which should identify who will 
execute the plan, document the company’s security policies in 
reference to other companies’ policies, and be reviewed on an 
annual basis as well as provided to TSA for review.136 
The Pipeline Security Guidelines also promulgate 
recommendations for natural gas pipeline cybersecurity measures 
based off of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”)’s “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity.”137 NIST’s framework sets “standards and best 
practices to assist organizations in managing cybersecurity risks” 
and “promote the protection of critical infrastructure.”138 TSA’s 
Pipeline Security Guidelines recommend that organizations follow 
NIST’s cybersecurity framework and list a number of industry and 
federal government entities for pipeline operators to consult as a 
reference for cybersecurity programs.139 
TSA’s guidelines, however thorough, are simply advisory.140 
The guidelines encourage the natural gas industry to implement the 
suggested security measures, but again, implementation is only 
encouraged, not mandated.141 Specifically, the guidelines state that 
they, “[do] not impose requirements on any person or company.”142 
These voluntary standards essentially leave the industry self-
regulated.143 
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C. Other Agencies that Play a Role in Natural Gas Pipeline 
Security  
While TSA is the current entity set to oversee natural gas 
pipeline safety and security, its means for incident response and 
recovery are scant.144 As a result, other agencies must play a role in 
natural gas pipeline safety and security.145 In 2010, TSA issued a 
“Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan,” which 
detailed the roles different federal agencies play in the case of a 
security incident.146  
As the energy specific agency, DOE plays a significant role in 
pipeline security response as the agency is “responsible for 
coordinating all activities related to energy infrastructure 
protection.”147 DOE is also responsible for the facilitation of 
assessments, reports, and restoration of “damaged energy systems 
and components.”148 During a natural gas pipeline emergency, DOE 
would coordinate with other federal agencies and the private sector 
to assess the supply of natural gas.149  
TSA Assistant Secretary or Secretary of Homeland Security is 
also an active participant in the event of a pipeline security threat or 
incident. Either Secretary may deploy Visible Intermodal 
Prevention and Response (“VIPR”) teams that work with local 
security and law enforcement and provide supplemental security.150 
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VIPR teams also provide pipeline companies “pre-incident 
deterrence measures” after a threat has been detected.151  
The final key agency in natural gas pipeline security is PHMSA. 
Within PHMSA lies the Office of Pipeline Safety, which is 
responsible for ensuring the “safe, reliable, and environmentally 
sound operations of our nation’s pipeline transportation system.”152 
PHMSA oversees interstate pipelines once a project is operating 
through monitored compliance which ensures pipelines operate 
safely and securely.153  
PHMSA seeks compliance with pipeline safety standards 
through pipeline inspections and investigation of safety incidents.154 
PHMSA can also provide assistance during response or recovery of 
a pipeline security incident through its Regional Emergency 
Transportation Coordinator.155 DOT can also issue special permits, 
safety orders, and corrective action orders in response to incidents.156  
Other agencies can provide support in different capacities in the 
event of a natural gas pipeline security incident. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, can provide support and planning during an 
incident.157 The Office of Infrastructure Protection within DHS 
coordinates efforts to reduce risk from terrorist activities.158 The 
National Transportation Safety Board investigates pipeline 
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transportation accidents unless the event becomes categorized as a 
criminal act, at which point the FBI would become involved.159  
The above agencies all play a role in a natural gas pipeline 
cybersecurity incident or attack.160 However, there is no concrete 
plan in place to ensure an attack does not occur, just general 
guidelines promulgated in the hopes the industry will rise to the 
standard. While a meticulous system with a detailed understanding 
of how to respond to an attack is undoubtedly useful and important, 
focus should be directed at preventing cyberattacks from occurring. 
VI. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CYBERSECURITY REGULATIONS 
SHOULD BE MANDATORY 
In the United States, cyberattacks and impending cyber warfare 
on natural gas pipelines are a legitimate concern exacerbated by the 
federal government’s ineffective oversight.161 Despite pushes by 
policy makers to make the cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines a 
national security issue, security regulations currently remain 
voluntary guidelines.162 The private sector, however, has advocated 
to keep natural gas pipeline cybersecurity standards voluntary.163 
A. The Private Sector’s Argument that Regulation Should Remain 
Voluntary 
The private sector has argued that natural gas pipeline 
cybersecurity standards should remain voluntary and would prefer 
cybersecurity be regulated in a “risk-based approach augmented by 
public-private partnerships.”164 The private sector has four core 
arguments as to why mandatory regulations should not be enacted: 
(1) prescriptive regulations would “increase business expenses and 
overhead[;]” (2) companies would be forced to comply with 
measures that rapidly become “out-of-date and ineffective[;]” (3) 
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the already functional public-private partnership to address 
cybersecurity would be disincentivized; and (4) stricter “regulations 
would not necessarily improve cybersecurity.”165 
Specifically, natural gas pipeline trade organizations like the 
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (“INGAA”) believe 
that “effective collaboration,” achieved through guidance rather 
than enforced regulations, is foundational to the security of natural 
gas pipelines.166 INGAA claims that “[r]eal-time, actionable 
information is vital to ensure [that] pipeline operators are equipped 
with the latest intelligence on threats,” which the pipeline industry 
already maintains through a network of information sharing.167 
INGAA further argues that mandatory regulations will corrode the 
effective relationship already in place between information sharing 
facilities and the oil and gas industry, TSA, and DHS.168  
Other proponents of voluntary regulation, such as Dan Coats, the 
Director of National Intelligence, further argue mandatory 
regulations inhibit the flexibility that is required for the industry to 
“adapt and update protocols” in responses to cyberattacks.169 
Specifically, “[e]xperience shows that mandatory standards often 
are outdated almost as soon as they are introduced.”170 Rather than 
mandatory regulations, there should be “baseline practices” on 
which the industry can build “in a way that matches the nimbleness 
of [] adversaries.”171 
Voluntary guidelines are not unique to natural gas pipelines.172 
Other “privately held critical infrastructure,” such as banks and 
telecommunications carriers, that would likely be targeted by a 
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“large-scale cyber-attack” are left to private regulation.173 Legal 
scholars have observed that the U.S. “follows a ‘bifurcated approach 
to network security’ that ‘relie[s] predominately on private 
investment in prevention and public investment in prosecution.’”174 
In other words, for much of America’s critical infrastructure, the 
government does not impose mandatory regulations and the 
companies are left alone to protect themselves, including their 
cyber-networks.175  
These arguments are combatted by a recent trend that “regular 
firms that operate in a competitive market (such as online retailers) 
may be adequately protecting their systems against ordinary 
intruders” whereas “strategically significant firms in uncompetitive 
markets (such as power companies and other public utilities) seem 
less likely to maintain defenses capable of protecting their systems 
against skilled and determined adversaries (such as foreign 
intelligence services).”176 As a result, while some members of the 
private industry may be equipped to handle the cyber-threats posed 
to firms in regulated markets, the private industry has not adequately 
protected natural gas pipelines.  
Even more notably, cyber-security is often overlooked by 
private industry when left to regulate itself.177 Rather, the cyber-
security field is “primarily concerned with negative externalities. 
Just as firms tend to underinvest in pollution controls because some 
costs of their emissions are borne by those who are downwind, they 
also tend to underinvest in cyber-defense because some costs of 
intrusions are externalized onto others.”178 The full cost of a 
cyberattack is not borne by the energy company, but is instead borne 
by the public at large who relies on the granted monopoly industry 
for an essential service, de-incentivizing energy companies to invest 
in the required defense mechanisms absent some mandatory 
regulation.179  
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B. Argument that Natural Gas Pipeline Regulations Should Be 
Mandatory 
Self-regulation may be sufficient for other private industries, but 
natural gas’ unique situation requires mandatory regulation to 
defend against pipeline cyberattacks. FERC Commissioner, Richard 
Glick, has spoken out about the weakness of these voluntary 
guidelines and states, “[i]f you just have one weak link—one entity 
that does not follow voluntary standards—it can cause significant 
damages.”180 Unfortunately, “America’s interest in protecting our 
critical infrastructure from national security threats is in tension with 
America’s interest in allowing the private sector to provide many 
essential services in critical infrastructure sectors.”181 However, 
with the U.S. openly engaged in “offensive cyber intrusions” against 
foreign nations, it is imperative to recognize and address the 
weaknesses in U.S energy cybersecurity.182  
It is an anomaly that the cybersecurity of natural gas pipelines 
has been left to market forces and voluntary action.183 After 9/11 the 
U.S. government moved from deregulation and privatization 
towards tightened regulations to strengthen homeland security.184 It 
is difficult to leave national defense and homeland security to 
market influences.185 
National defense and homeland security are public goods where 
individuals share in the benefits irrespective of how much they spend [if 
at all]. Markets are inefficient at supplying goods and services in 
situations where groups of people must work together to achieve a good 
outcome but the incentive for investment and cooperation is low. In these 
situations, the private sector will not produce an optimal outcome.186 
The private sector controls a majority (85%) of “cyber relevant 
critical infrastructure in the U.S.” and while the private sector has a 
great interest in protecting that infrastructure from cyberthreats, 
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those “may not align exactly with the interests of the government or 
the public.”187 For example, specific individual companies may not 
believe they will be the target of a foreign cyberterrorist act.188 As a 
result, that individual company may calculate that it is not in its best 
interest to protect against a hypothetical, seemingly unlikely 
attack.189 The government may see it in the opposite light in that an 
unsuspecting utility is the exact target for an adversary.190 
These interests are further exemplified when private businesses 
employ cost-benefit analyses.191 If the cost to protect a company 
from a cyberattack is outweighed by the cost of recovery after an 
attack, the company is unlikely to employ the security measure.192 
Companies are further discouraged from investing in security 
measures because the company does not fully “internalize the 
negative and positive externalities of a successful cyberattack.”193 
For example, a company will internalize the cost of new computers, 
new infrastructure, and lost revenue in the wake of a cyberattack but 
the government will assist in finding the culprit and get the 
computers operational.194 
In other industries, insurance has served as an implicit regulator, 
and has been used as a “tool to ‘outsource’ public regulations” in 
industries without full governmental regulation.195 Insurance may 
function as a form of private regulation, governing how 
organizations handle risks.196 As a result, insurance can prevent and 
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mitigate losses associated with various risks such as external 
catastrophes.197 Regulation through insurance can also incentivize 
organizations to protect themselves against disasters and 
catastrophic risks.198  
Through techniques such as risked-based pricing, contract 
design, loss prevention, claim management, and refusal to insure, 
insurance can regulate potentially devastating events.199 Insurance 
has been an effective implicit regulator in some industries, such as 
automobile, workplace, environmental, and medical liability.200 
Insurance has prevented environmental accidents, protected against 
flood and hurricane damage and combated climate-related 
extremes.201 However effective in other industries, insurance has not 
filled the regulatory gap of natural gas pipeline cybersecurity 
because the insurance companies perceive the inadequate TSA 
guidelines as “best industry practice.”202  
Ultimately, federal mandatory regulation is necessary and 
inevitable.203 The private industry is not able to regulate effectively 
and insurance cannot act as an implicit regulator.204 While energy 
infrastructure has not yet experienced a deadly or severely 
destructive event from a cybersecurity breach, the threat is very real 
as has been demonstrated by a number of real-world examples.205 
Historical examples have shown that when the U.S. is attacked, the 
nation responds with legislation.206 However, instead of waiting for 
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the inevitable attack, the U.S. should promulgate mandatory 
regulations to prevent an attack on the country’s natural gas 
pipelines. 
VII.  THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHOULD HAVE THE 
ABILITY TO REGULATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE 
CYBERSECURITY 
Updated and mandatory cybersecurity regulations for natural 
gas pipelines have been advocated for by a number of groups. The 
Government Accountability Office issued a report that accurately 
described TSA’s guidelines as insufficient and, even though 
reissued in 2018, outdated because a number of critical areas were 
not revised.207 TSA’s Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery 
Protocol Plan has also not been updated since its issuance in 2010.208 
Further, TSA has no current plans to revise pipeline security threats, 
such as cybersecurity threats.209 
A. TSA Should Not be the Agency to Promulgate Mandatory 
Natural Gas Pipeline Cybersecurity Regulations 
According to FERC Chairman, Neil Chatterjee, and FERC 
Commissioner, Richard Glick, natural gas pipelines “must comply 
with mandatory standards” to “protect against attacks that could 
compromise electric service.”210 The two FERC leaders, however, 
do not advocate that TSA, the primary agency to oversee natural gas 
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pipeline cybersecurity, should be the agency to implement 
mandatory regulations.211  
Practically, TSA is not equipped to implement and enforce 
mandatory regulations.212 As of May 2017, TSA had a mere six full-
time employees in charge of security oversight for the millions of 
miles of pipelines, equating to approximately 450,000 miles of 
pipeline per employee.213 Of these employees, none have “the 
specialized computer system expertise needed to support more 
extensive cybersecurity activities.”214  
TSA has not even kept up with the limited guidelines they have 
implemented. To assess pipeline vulnerabilities, TSA is supposed to 
conduct pipeline security reviews, known as Corporate Security 
Reviews (“CSRs”) and Critical Facility Security Reviews.215 
However, TSA’s limited number of staff has prevented TSA from 
conducting an appropriate amount of reviews.216 In order to 
effectively review the “top 100 critical pipeline systems,” a TSA 
priority, TSA would need to conduct 46 CSRs.217 However, in 2018 
TSA officials stated that their goal was to conduct between 15-23 
CSRs per year.218 TSA has not risen to meet its stated goal as in 2012 
and 2013, only 14 full reviews were conducted, and only one was 
conducted in 2014.219 
B. The Department of Energy is the Appropriate Agency to 
Promulgate Mandatory Natural Gas Pipeline Cybersecurity 
Regulations 
TSA is not equipped to implement and enforce mandatory 
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security of all U.S. transportation is a tall order and TSA simply does 
not have the resources devoted to protecting natural gas pipelines 
from the cyberthreats they face. Congress, various federal agencies 
and the executive branch have all indicated, however, that DOE is 
the agency to implement stronger natural gas cybersecurity 
measures.220 DOE already plays an active role in pipeline security 
and incident response and should move into the position of being 
the primary preventative agency by implementing mandatory 
regulations.221  
Congress has taken note of natural gas pipeline cybersecurity 
threats. Fred Upton, a Representative from Michigan, stated “[w]e 
know that Russian agents and other nation states are waging cyber 
war on our energy infrastructure. It’s critical to address these 
threats.”222 Members of Congress from both the Democratic and 
Republican parties have taken steps to tighten pipeline 
cybersecurity, but Congress has not directed legislation towards 
TSA.223 It appears that Congressional advocates of stronger natural 
gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations think DOE is best equipped 
to promulgate cybersecurity rules as representatives have introduced 
a number of bills that direct cybersecurity initiatives to DOE, not 
TSA.224 
The Pipeline and Liquified Natural Gas Facility Cybersecurity 
Preparedness Act (“H.R. 370”) is one of the most prominent bills in 
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the slew of pipeline cybersecurity legislation. Introduced by U.S. 
Representative Fred Upton, H.R. 370 is a step towards tightening 
energy infrastructure’s physical and cybersecurity guidelines by 
requiring DOE to establish policies and procedures that would 
ensure the security of natural gas pipelines.225 H.R. 370 seeks to 
ensure the “security, resiliency, and survivability of natural gas 
pipelines” by establishing policies and procedures that coordinate 
states, federal agencies, and the energy sector.226 
H.R. 370 calls for the development of “advanced cybersecurity 
applications and technologies for natural gas pipelines.”227 This 
would include performing “pilot demonstration projects . . . with 
representatives of the energy sector,” creating “workforce 
development curricula,” and providing “technological tools to help 
the energy sector voluntarily evaluate, prioritize, and improve 
physical security and cybersecurity capabilities of natural gas 
pipelines.”228 While the Bill represents a step towards mandatory 
regulation, it still leaves some regulatory efforts voluntary.229 The 
Bill calls for the development of advanced cybersecurity 
applications and technology but only for voluntary use.230 Similarly, 
H.R. 370 aims to “provide technical tools to help the energy sector 
voluntarily evaluate, prioritize, and improve physical security and 
cybersecurity capabilities.”231 
Statutory interpretation would suggest that only those two 
specific provisions are voluntary, while the remaining provisions are 
mandatory. In drafting H.R. 370, Congress specifically noted which 
provisions were voluntary by explicitly including the term 
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“voluntary.”232  As a result, it can be reasonably interpreted that in 
the absence of the term “voluntary,” a provision is then mandatory.   
H.R. 370 is surrounded by a host of other legislation from the 
116th Congress concerning energy infrastructure’s physical and 
cybersecurity, all directed at DOE. For example, H.R. 360, the 
Cyber Sense Act of 2019, would require the Secretary of Energy to 
“establish a voluntary Cyber Sense program to test the cybersecurity 
of products and technologies intended for use in the bulk-power 
system.”233  
Similarly, H.R. 362, the Energy Emergency Leadership Act, 
would amend the Department of Energy Organization Act to assign 
Assistant Secretaries new responsibilities in energy emergency 
response.234 Assistant DOE secretaries would possess energy 
security functions such as  “infrastructure, cybersecurity, emerging 
threats, supply, and emergency planning, coordination, response, 
and restoration. . .”235  
Furthermore, H.R. 359, the Enhancing Grid Security through 
Public-Private Partnership Act, would require the Secretary of 
Energy to submit to Congress a report that assesses, among other 
things, “priorities, policies, procedures, and actions for enhancing 
the physical security and cybersecurity of electricity distribution 
systems to address threats to, and vulnerabilities of, such electricity 
distribution systems.”236 Like H.R. 370, H.R. 359 would require 
some voluntary actions from DOE such as providing voluntary 
implementation of electric grid utility cybersecurity assessments, 
but other provisions do not state that they are voluntary.237 Under 
H.R. 359, some seemingly mandatory actions are to provide and 
assist with cybersecurity risk training to electric utilities, increase 
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As described by Representative Upton and Energy and 
Commerce Committee Republican leader, Representative Greg 
Walden, “[t]hese bills reflect [the Energy and Commerce] 
Committee’s commitment to strengthen energy delivery, security, 
and reliability for Americans. We are advancing legislation to 
bolster our protections against cybersecurity threats to energy 
infrastructure, which is key to the Department of Energy’s 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities.”239 While these 
pieces of proposed legislation do not direct DOE to promulgate 
mandatory regulations, they are efforts to strengthen natural gas 
pipeline and electric grid cybersecurity and vest responsibilities in 
DOE.  
FERC’s Chairman Chatterjee and Commissioner Glick, also 
think DOE is the appropriate agency to implement mandatory 
regulations.240 “Congress should vest responsibility for pipeline 
security with an agency that fully comprehends the energy sector 
and has sufficient resources to address this growing threat.”241 DOE 
certainly understands the energy sector. Further, DOE is the 
“Sector-Specific Agency for energy security” and has created an 
office for cybersecurity.242  
The executive branch also appears to the think that DOE is the 
agency to tighten natural gas pipeline cybersecurity. The Trump 
Administration has announced that it is “establishing an office 
within the [DOE] to shore up cybersecurity for critical infrastructure 
like nuclear plants, refineries, and pipelines.”243 Now within DOE 
lies the Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency 
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Response, posed to “strengthen the DOE’s ability to play a vital role 
protecting energy infrastructure from cyber threats . . . .”244 
DOE has also stepped up to play a more active role in 
cybersecurity of the natural gas pipeline industry. DOE, not TSA is 
leading a “consortium over concerns industrial control systems” 
(private entities and key industries concerned with energy 
infrastructure cybersecurity threats).245 The consortium is working 
together towards recommendations to increase natural gas pipeline 
cybersecurity.246  
While the recommendations again would not be mandatory 
regulations, DOE has begun to come into a role whereby they can 
conduct pipeline oversight and eventually implement prescriptive 
regulations. As cyber-threats become more inevitable and as DOE 
obtains more authority over pipeline oversight, DOE should become 
the agency to issue mandatory regulation and be the agency to 
oversee the implementation of that regulation. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
With the advancement of technology comes threats that were not 
previously of concern. Today, natural gas pipelines faces new cyber-
threats that change and evolve rapidly. Cyberattacks on the energy 
grid have evolved into an active warfare tool and while the U.S. has 
not yet experienced a cyberattack that resulted in loss of life or 
serious infrastructure destruction, the U.S. is vulnerable and has still 
experienced relatively less significant cyber intrusions. While the 
U.S. has a history of passing reactive legislation after a significant 
event, America should proactively equip critical energy 
infrastructure with the tools they need to prevent and respond to a 
cyberattack. 
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The current regulatory framework to address cybersecurity 
threats to natural gas pipelines is a set of voluntary guidelines 
promulgated by TSA that simply encourage private industries to 
comply. However, these guidelines are insufficient and will likely 
be ineffective in the face of a serious cyberattack. The most effective 
mechanism to protect against a significant cyberattack is to require 
mandatory natural gas pipeline cybersecurity regulations.  
TSA is not the agency that should promulgate mandatory 
regulations—the agency simply does not have the necessary 
resources, nor expertise. Rather, DOE, the agency over all of energy 
that already plays an active role in pipeline security, should 
implement mandatory guidelines. Congress has increased DOE’s 
oversight of energy cybersecurity. President Trump has vested DOE 
with some cybersecurity authority and various agencies, including 
FERC, have advocated that DOE take the lead in pipeline 
cybersecurity regulations. DOE is coming into the role of pipeline 
cybersecurity oversight by beginning to work with the industry to 
update and increase pipeline cybersecurity, and the agency should 
continue this trend by promulgating mandatory cybersecurity 
regulations.  
  
 
